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1 Introduction
People flowing into unemployment are heterogeneous with respect to their chances
of finding a new job. These differences include different innate ability, general ed-
ucation, human capital accumulated on the the last job and their unemployment
history. Also, chances of reemployment generally vary over different segments of
the labor market. Typically, workers searching for a job are better informed about
their job opportunities than a government agency in charge of providing unemploy-
ment insurance (UI). This asymmetric information may prevail due to unobservable
characteristics or because it is too costly to elicit information. The literature on
optimal unemployment insurance generally neglects this unobserved heterogeneity
[Karni (1999) provides a comprehensive overview].1 It mainly focuses on the trade-
off between setting incentives to search and insurance aspects of providing benefits
to a representative agent.2 This is remarkable since self-selection from a menu of
contracts is common practice when dealing with heterogeneous populations in the
design of health insurance or car insurance markets.
In this paper, we ask whether offering a menu of unemployment insurance con-
tracts is welfare improving and what the optimal contracts look like. We adopt a
multi-period contract theoretical framework, introduced by Shavell and Weiss (1979)
and later refined and simulated by Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997). We extend their
representative agent framework to encompass heterogeneity in the job search tech-
nology, i.e., we introduce types of agents that differ with respect to their probability
of finding a job when controlling for search effort. We compute the optimal menu
of UI contracts offered by a UI agency from which each agent selects his preferred
contract.
As Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997), our paper technically builds on recursive so-
lutions of repeated games and principal-agent problems as analyzed in the papers
by Spear and Srivastava (1987), Thomas and Worrall (1990), Abreu, Pearce and
Stacchetti (1990), Atkeson and Lucas (1992) and Chang (1998). However, our com-
bination of adverse selection with repeated moral hazard has not been studied yet.
Furthermore, concerning the adverse selection problem, agents’ types, which param-
eterize their chances of finding a job, are drawn only once but affect their chances in
all future periods. This permanent heterogeneity in our model implies that the first
period is distinct from the following periods. Both the adverse selection incentive
constraints and the entitlement constraints in the principal’s problem have to hold
1Exceptions are Mortensen (1983) and Wang and Williamson (2002). For a discussion see below.
2Atkinson and Micklewright (1991) and Meyer (1995) survey the empirical literature that doc-
uments disincentive effects from providing UI.
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only in the first period whereas moral hazard incentive constraints hold in every
period. Although we assume full commitment, there is no ”natural” way to state
such a problem recursively. Additional state variables that restrict the planner’s
choices have to be added, similar to Fernandes and Phelan (2000).
In the numerical solution procedure we face an unresolved difficulty (in the gen-
eral case) in the recursive contracts literature building on the Abreu et al. (1990)
methodology, namely the efficient calculation of the sets of ”sustainable outcomes”.3
Our main theorem provides a precise analytical characterization of the set of sus-
tainable outcomes in our setup. This characterization renders a numerical imple-
mentation feasible. In particular, we prove certain topological properties of the set
of sustainable outcomes that ensure an efficient computation that considerably im-
proves in terms of accuracy upon previous algorithms [compare e.g. section 8 of
Chang (1998)].
The paper answers the following questions. First, under which circumstances will
it be optimal to offer only one UI contract to all agents - a situation that resembles
real world UI schemes in most countries? Second, are all optimal UI contracts de-
creasing, as in the representative-agent setup [see Fredriksson and Holmlund (2006)]?
We can show analytically (under fairly standard conditions) that in the optimum
separating contracts should be offered. We then investigate the shape of optimal
contracts numerically in a framework where two types of agents (good and bad) face
different hazard rates of finding a job (given a certain search effort). We show that
the contract for the good searcher has a decreasing benefit profile, as the one he
would be offered in a pure moral hazard environment. In contrast, the contract of
the bad searcher will tend to have an upward-sloping benefit profile.4 The reason
for this can be understood by recalling the simpler setup when agents only differ in
their hidden exogenous job finding probabilities (so that there is adverse selection,
but no moral hazard). In that case, good searchers tend to enjoy a flat profile (full
consumption smoothing)) and receive an information rent over their promised util-
ity. The bad searcher faces a higher risk of longer unemployment duration and will
consequently discount future unemployment benefit payments less than the good
type. An increasing profile partially insures bad searchers against unemployment
without giving good searchers much of an incentive to claim they are bad searchers
3This terminology was introduced by Abreu et al. (1990). It describes the sets of contracts that
are implementable taking into account future choices which again have to take into account initial
choices and so on and so forth.
4Werning (2002) and Kocherlakota (2004) consider optimal unemployment insurance with un-
observable savings (in contrast savings are observable in our paper). They find that optimal
unemployment benefits are not necessarily decreasing with unemployment duration.
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since good searchers value later payments of benefits less. This is the basic consid-
eration for self-selection of the agents. In our more general case with moral hazard
and adverse selection, the slope of the bad type’s contract is ambiguous since the
moral hazard consideration induces a negative slope whereas the adverse selection
consideration induces an increase in the slope (relative to the pure moral hazard
contract). The slope of the good type’s contract is unambiguously negative since
moral hazard requires setting search incentives (as in Shavell and Weiss (1979)) rel-
ative to the full consumption smoothing benchmark. We also provide a numerical
comparative-statics analysis of changes in various parameters and give a detailed
intuition of our results.
In the optimal-UI literature the issue of adverse selection has been raised first
by Mortensen (1983) who applies the seminal Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) paper
to UI. His analysis is, however, static and does not include search incentives. Wang
and Williamson (2002) present a numerical welfare analysis of the effect of (full
and partial) experience rating on optimal UI in a dynamic economy with moral
hazard and heterogeneous agents. Their framework is different from ours in that
their model includes endogenous work effort as well as precautionary saving but
they assume that there is the same UI scheme for all agents. In contrast in our
model agents choose from a set of different UI contracts offered by the principal.
Hopenhayn and Nicolini (2001) address the issue of heterogeneity of agents in a two
period model of UI similar to their earlier work. They assume, however, that the
agents’ type is observable and contractible. Lentz (2005) estimates a heterogeneous
agent search model on Danish data. He also considers optimal UI but he does
not compute the optimal benefit profile over the unemployment spell and there is
no adverse selection problem. Joseph and Weitzenblum (2003) find that taking into
account transitional dynamics in the presence of precautionary savings substantially
affects the optimal replacement ratio. Heterogeneity in their model is different from
this paper, as it refers to different asset holdings. They also do not consider the
optimal UI profile.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 the model is introduced and our
assumptions are motivated. In section 3 the analytical results are presented. In
section 4 the model is solved numerically; we also present an extensive comparative
statics exercise. Section 5 discusses various possible extensions of our model. Proofs
are given in the appendix.
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2 Model
Our framework for analyzing UI is a dynamic principal-agent model. The principal
represents the government (or UI agency) providing social insurance.
The agents’ problem: The agents are unemployed workers searching for a job.
There is a continuum of agents, modeled by the unit interval. The agents are of
two types, differing in their opportunities of finding a new job. The differences
between the two types of agents in their search technology are expressed by agent
i’s probability of remaining unemployed pi(a), which is a function of the search effort
a he exerts (we will sharpen the notion of heterogeneity formally below). The agents
have private information about their types. The fraction of agents of type B (“bad
searcher”) q and of type G (“good searcher”) 1− q are common knowledge. Except
for the difference in search technologies (as formalized below), we assume that agents
are identical. In particular, we assume that both agents are equally risk-averse, and
enjoy the same utility u(.) from consumption. In addition, we assume that once an
agent starts work , he will keep his job with a fixed wage rate w until his death in
period T .5 We can thus calculate an employed agent’s total expected lifetime utility
in period t as:
Wt =
T∑
l=t
βl−tu(w),
where β is the discount factor for both type of agents and the principal.6
Unemployed agents receive possibly time-varying UI benefits. We denote by bt
the benefit received in period t. Given any benefit scheme {b1, ..., bT}, the agent
chooses his search effort at in any period in which he is unemployed. In his decision
to increase his search effort he faces a trade-off between increasing search costs on
the one hand and an increasing probability of reemployment on the other. The
total lifetime utility he expects when remaining unemployed is the key variable
determining this decision. We denote by V it+1 an unemployed agent’s total expected
lifetime utility in period t + 1, where i = B,G. Moreover, in the sequel we will
5Technically, the assumption that both agents receive the same wage is in no way important
for our analysis; it is introduced for the sake of simplicity. In the solution to our model we could
keep track of the impact of different wages for B and G on the search incentives; qualitatively, the
results would not change.
6The restriction to a finite time horizon T is a computational requirement (see below). We
could, as in Wang and Williamson (2002), without changing the results of this paper, relax this
assumption and assume that agents live forever but UI is received for T periods only.
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denote by zt = u(bt) the utility value of consuming benefit bt. Thus we can state
agent i’s problem (i = B,G) in period t recursively by:
V it = max
a
zt − a+ β[pi(a)V it+1 + (1− pi(a))Wt+1], (1)
where we assumed that effort enters utility linearly. Recall thatWt+1 is an employed
agent’s expected lifetime utility where employment starts in t+ 1. We denote by aˆit
the decision of agent i:
aˆit = argmaxa zt − a+ β[pi(a)V it+1 + (1− pi(a))Wt+1]. (2)
The principal will have to take into account the decisions by the agents when de-
signing contracts for them. These constraints are known as moral hazard incentive
constraints (MH-IC).
The principal’s problem: The principal’s objective is to minimize the cost of
providing a certain “level” of insurance by the design of (a menu of) optimal con-
tracts for the agents. Hereby the current cost function c(.) is the inverse of the
agent’s utility function: c(zi) ≡ u−1(zi) = bi. Future costs are discounted with the
discount factor β. We will call {zi1, ..., ziT} a contract designed for agent i (with
i = B,G). We will often use the terms contract b and contract g to denote the con-
tracts designed for agents B and G respectively. Agents choose one contract from
the offered contracts in period 0. We assume that the principal can fully commit
to the contract promised in period zero. The following property of c(.) is implied
by monotonicity and strict concavity of an agent’s utility function u(.), i.e. risk
aversion.
Condition 2.1 The cost function c(.) is increasing and is strictly convex.
In his minimization problem, the principal has to take into consideration the
different reemployment probabilities of the agents. Furthermore, he has to take
into account the following constraints: First, as mentioned above, he has to take
into consideration the agents’ decision problem, i.e. the moral hazard incentive
constraints. Second, the principal has to guarantee incentive compatibility due
to adverse selection, i.e. he has to ensure that each agent chooses the contract
designed for him. Third, he has to respect the entitlement V (i.e. total expected
lifetime utility) that the contracts should at least guarantee to agents B and G
respectively. This entitlement can be interpreted as the “level of insurance” the
principal is willing to guarantee. Any value of the entitlement V can be mapped
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one-to-one to a “certainty equivalent replacement rate”, i.e. to a percentage of the
wage w which is consumed every period and which provides lifetime utility of exactly
V . This interpretation will be used to calibrate reasonable values of V later on.
The principal’s problem can thus be stated as:
min
{zB1 ,...,zBT },{zG1 ,...,zGT }
q[c(zB1 ) + βpB(aˆ
B
1 )[c(z
B
2 ) + βpB(aˆ
B
2 )[c(z
B
3 ) + ...]...]] +
(1− q)[c(zG1 ) + βpG(aˆG1 )[c(zG2 ) + βpG(aˆG2 )[c(zG3 ) + ...]...]]
subject to the entitlement constraints (EC)
V b,B1 ≥ V , (3)
V g,G1 ≥ V , (4)
and the adverse selection incentive constraints (AS-IC)
V b,B1 ≥ V g,B1 , (5)
V g,G1 ≥ V b,G1 . (6)
The hat on the a’s describing the choices of effort of the agents, aˆ, indicates that the
principal respects the (MH-IC). We abbreviate the principal’s problem by (ASUI).
In the formulation of the (ASUI), V j,it denotes total expected lifetime utility in period
t for the unemployed agent i (i = B,G) if he selects contract j (j = b, g). The
superscript j indicates for which agent the contract is designed, i.e. contract b is
designed for agent B and contract g for agent G. A priori both agents can of course
choose either contract before period 1, although the AS-IC constraints ensure that
they will in fact choose the contract designed for them. The entitlement constraints
guarantee that the chosen contract gives the promised utility. Both the V j,it s and
the aˆits can be calculated recursively from the array of equations 1 and 2 given a
contract.
Remark 2.2 If agents are homogeneous in their search costs, i.e. they all have the
same pi(a), then the setup is identical to the one considered by Shavell and Weiss
(1979) (except for the finite time dimension).
To make our problem interesting, the initial entitlements to total expected life-
time utility have to be below the total lifetime utility from work. If the entitlements
V i,jt are higher thanWt for any period posterior to one in that the unemployed agents
exert search effort, the efforts would necessarily be zero, and thus the probability of
remaining unemployed pi would be 1.
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Condition 2.3 The utility entitlement of the unemployed agent is below the one
guaranteed by lifetime work: V < W1.
We will see in the sequel that this condition guarantees that all optimal V i,jt are
smaller than Wt.
Formalization of the agents’ heterogeneity: Now we formalize in detail the
idea that agents differ in their reemployment probabilities. To develop the model
formally, we first make some standard technical assumptions on the pi(.) functions.
Condition 2.4 The probability of remaining unemployed pi(a) of agent i:
1. Smoothness: pi(a) ∈ C∞(R).
2. Monotonicity and strict convexity: p′i(a) < 0, p
′′
i (a) > 0.
3. Boundary conditions: pi(0) = 1, lima→∞ pi(a) = 0.
4. Inada conditions: lima→0 p′i(a) = −∞, lima→∞ p′i(a) = 0.
Condition 2.4 ensures that the agents’ problem (1) always has a unique interior
solution that can be characterized by a first order condition.
The basic difference between the two types of agents in their search technology is
expressed by agent i’s probability of remaining unemployed pi(a), which is a function
of the search effort a he exerts:
Condition 2.5 Given the same effort, type B has a higher probability of remaining
unemployed than type G: pB(a) > pG(a).
Condition 2.6 (Spence-Mirrlees property)
∂V Bt (z1, ..., zT )
∂zt+s
− ∂V
G
t (z1, ..., zT )
∂zt+s
> 0 (7)
for all t with 1 ≤ t ≤ T and s with 1 ≤ s ≤ T − t.
Condition 2.6, which is standard in classical contract theory, sharpens the basic
concept of a bad or good searcher. It implies that - faced with the same contract -
the bad searcher may exert a higher search effort than the good searcher under this
contract, but his effort will not be so high that his chance of finding a job exceeds
the good searcher’s chance:
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Lemma 2.7 Condition 2.6 holds if and only if agents facing the same contract
{z1, ..., zT}, in equilibrium exert efforts such that pB(aBt ) > pG(aGt ).
Conditions 2.4 to 2.6 will be used in all results that follow. For our first result - on
the optimality of separating the types - we need one more assumption on pi(.). As
we mentioned above, Condition 2.4 ensures that the agent’s choice of effort from (1)
can be characterized by the following first order condition:
p′i(a
i
t) =
1
β(V it+1 −Wt+1)
. (8)
Equation (8) establishes a one-to-one and smooth relation between V it and a
i
t. We
can therefore define the following function for the next-to-last period:
pii(zT ) ≡ pi(aiT−1) = pi
(
(p′i)
−1
(
1
β(zT − u(w))
))
So pii(zT ) is agent i’s probability of remaining unemployed when facing benefit utility
zT in the last period. It is clear that pii is increasing. We formulate a condition on
the elasticity of pii with respect to zT , which - of course - implicitly puts restrictions
on the choice of pi(.).
Condition 2.8
1. The marginal probability of remaining unemployed ∂pii(z)
∂z
of agent i facing
promised utility z is greater for agent G than for agent B:
∂piG(z)
∂z
>
∂piB(z)
∂z
2. If the marginal probabilities ∂pii(z)
∂z
of agent G and B are equal for two utility
values zG and zB, then the utility of G, zG, must be smaller than the utility of
B, zB:
∂piG(z
G)
∂z
=
∂piB(z
B)
∂z
⇒ zG < zB.
What is the economic content of Condition 2.8? The first part says that agent G
reacts more strongly to a change in the promise z than agent B. In other words: The
probability of finding a new job depends more critically on the UI benefit promise in
the case of agent G than in the case of agent B. Note that here we compare agents
G and B that face the same contract. The second part of Condition 2.8 says that
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whenever the reaction is equal, then agent G must face a lower promise than agent
B. Summarizing Condition 2.8 we can say that the “incentive sensitivity” of agent
G is higher than that of agent B.
What role do Conditions 2.6 to 2.8 play in our analysis? The model presented in
this paper incorporates two different paradigms, hidden information and (repeated)
hidden action. Condition 2.6 is the typical technical assumption in hidden infor-
mation models. Condition 2.8 is a condition that ensures in our setup a feature of
(pure) repeated hidden action that has been analyzed numerically in Pavoni (forth-
coming) and discussed in Hopenhayn and Nicolini (2001): In the full information
case, the decline of the UI benefits over time is sharper for better searchers. Loosely
speaking, Conditions 2.6 and 2.8 ensure that our model exhibits the “standard”
behavior of a pure hidden information model and a pure hidden action model. We
will see in Section 4 that both conditions will be met in the functional specification
of our simulation.
3 Theoretical Results
In this section we develop a characterization of the solution to the principal’s prob-
lem. First, we will however turn to a standard question in contract theory.
Pooling is not optimal: The first question we ask is whether and under what
circumstances it is actually optimal to offer two contracts in order to screen the
agents. The answer gives a first indication that it may indeed be relevant to consider
the cost-saving potential of a differentiated UI.
Proposition 3.1 There exists a solution to the Principal’s Problem (ASUI). If Con-
dition 2.8 holds, any solution is separating.
What makes the theorem very appealing from a more applied perspective is
the fact that our numerical implementation with Constant Relative Risk Aversion
(CRRA) utility shows that the good searcher typically reacts more sensitively (in the
sense of Condition 2.8) to the search incentives than the bad searcher. Considering
this numerical result as robust, we could claim that the UI agency has a definite
potential for cost-saving by switching from offering only one to offering two UI
contracts.
But what should the optimal contracts look like? The answer to this question
is not immediately obvious: We can neither apply the Shavell and Weiss (1979)
approach directly, since we should expect the influence of hidden information on
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the optimal design of the contracts, nor can we apply standard solutions of adverse
selection models that do not incorporate repeated hidden action. Moreover, we
cannot hope to find a direct recursive formulation of the problem, because both
the adverse selection incentive constraints and the entitlement constraints in the
principal’s problem (ASUI) have to hold only in the first period.
The solution of the model: In the sequel, we develop a characterization of the
solution to the principal’s problem (ASUI) in Propositions 3.2, 3.3 and 3.7. The
strategy is as follows: We first give a quasi-recursive formulation of the principal’s
problem (ASUI), i.e. a formulation that splits up (ASUI) into an adverse selection
problem formulated in terms of each agent’s total lifetime utilities and two cost
functions that are themselves solutions to recursive problems. The philosophy is
to look first at each contract separately, ignoring for a moment the issue of self-
selection. Proposition 3.2 gives a recursive formulation of the problem of finding a
cost-minimizing contract that provides agents B and G with two arbitrarily specified
levels of ex ante lifetime utility (a pair of first-period entitlements) if both of them
choose this contract. The recursive formulations summarize the cost minimization
for each contract in a compact way. In this formulation the pairs of entitlements (one
pair for each contract) and their evolution over time serve as state variables of the
problem (cf. Hopenhayn and Nicolini (2001)). We then merge the two separately
solved cost minimization problems and state the original adverse selection problem
faced by the principal as a four-dimensional minimization problem in the (two pairs
of) entitlements of the first period.
The question left open by Proposition 3.2 is which pairs of entitlements are actu-
ally jointly feasible under a given contract (still ignoring the issue of self-selection).
The answer to this question has to take into account the choices of effort by the
agents induced by the contract under consideration as well as the laws of motion for
the entitlements. Proposition 3.3 gives a precise theoretical and numerically useful
description of the correspondence Γt, mapping pairs of entitlements of the agents to-
day (V Bt , V
G
t ) to jointly feasible policy options (zt, V
B
t+1, V
G
t+1), i.e. the benefit today
and the entitlements for tomorrow. This proposition is the main theoretical result of
the paper and serves as the cornerstone of our recursive numerical implementation.
We can now calculate the cost of a given contract that provides agents with any
feasible pairs of first period entitlements.
Finally, we can further simplify the adverse selection problem stated in Proposi-
tion 3.2. Proposition 3.7 shows that the entitlement constraint of G must be slack,
and that the entitlement constraint of B and the adverse selection incentive con-
straint of G must be binding at the solution. This reduces the dimension of the
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problem from four to two which allows us to solve the problem with high numerical
accuracy.
We begin the characterization of the solution by a reformulation of the princi-
pal’s problem (ASUI). The adverse selection problem is stated in terms of recursive
subproblems for contract b and contract g, i.e. the contract designed for agents B
and G respectively. As usual in adverse selection problems, we anticipate that only
agent B will choose contract b in the end and thus stochastically discount costs at
his rate. For the time being, the lifetime (or first period) entitlements of contract
b for agents B and G, V b,B and V b,G, are taken as given. Their optimal values for
given entitlement constraints from the original problem will be calculated in Propo-
sition 3.7 below. The recursive formulation of the contracts takes the form of a
(finite-dimensional) Bellman equation: The principal minimizes the costs of paying
out a benefit worth zt (in utility units) today and promising entitlements V
b,B
t+1 and
V b,Gt+1 for tomorrow. In doing so, he has to observe the entitlements of B and G to-
day, V b,Bt and V
b,G
t , which serve as state variables of the problem. A law of motion
connects the state and the choice variables. We denote the set of possible choices
(zbt , V
b,B
t+1 , V
b,G
t+1 ) in state (V
b,B
t , V
b,G
t ) by Γt(V
b,B
t , V
b,G
t ). This correspondence will be
characterized later in Proposition 3.3. Moreover, the choices of effort ait from the
agents’ problem facing the promised entitlement V it+1 for tomorrow, i.e. the MH-IC,
are taken as given by the principal. The recursive formulation is completed by two
boundary conditions: The first period entitlements V b,B1 and V
b,G
1 of course have
to equal the promised ex ante lifetime utilities V b,B and V b,G respectively. In the
last period, the entitlements V b,BT and V
b,G
T have to take the value of the last period
benefit zbT . To see this, recall that we consider agents who chose the same contract,
namely contract b. So both receive a benefit of zT in the last period. But in the
last period, unlike all other periods, there is no way of splitting the promise for that
period into a benefit in that period and a promise one period later, because there is
no period later.
The following proposition gives a quasi-recursive characterization of the princi-
pal’s problem (ASUI).
Proposition 3.2 (Quasi-recursive formulation of ASUI) The problem (ASUI)
can be reformulated in the following way:
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min
V b,B ,V b,G,V g,B ,V g,G
qCb1(V
b,B, V b,G) + (1− q)Cg1 (V g,B, V g,G) (9)
s.t. Γ1(V
b,B, V b,G) 6= ∅ (10)
Γ1(V
g,B, V g,G) 6= ∅ (11)
V b,B ≥ V g,B (12)
V g,G ≥ V b,G (13)
V b,B ≥ V (14)
V g,G ≥ V . (15)
In this formulation we use cost functions CB1 (V
b,B, V b,G) and CG1 (V
g,B, V g,G)
in the lifetime utilities V i,j that contract i guarantees to agent j (with i ∈ {b, g}
and j ∈ {B,G}). We also use the correspondence Γt(V i,Bt , V i,Gt ) that maps the
lifetime utilities in period t, (V i,Bt , V
i,G
t ) onto a set of jointly feasible choice variables
(zt, V
i,B
t+1 , V
i,G
t+1). The cost functions have the following recursive form (in order to
facilitate the presentation, we concentrate on contract b, dropping the index b from
V b,jt ):
Cbt (V
B
t , V
G
t ) = min{zbt ,V Bt+1,V Gt+1}∈Γt(V Bt ,V Gt )
c(zbt ) + βpB(a
B)Cbt+1(V
B
t+1, V
G
t+1) (16)
subject to:
Law of motion for contract b (LOM)
zbt − aB + β[pB(aB)V Bt+1 + (1− pB(aB))Wt+1] = V Bt
zbt − aG + β[pG(aG)V Gt+1 + (1− pG(aG))Wt+1] = V b,Gt ,
choice of effort in contract b (MH-IC)
aB = argmaxa z
b
t − a+ β[pB(a)V Bt+1 + (1− pB(a))Wt+1]
aG = argmaxa z
b
t − a+ β[pG(a)V Gt+1 + (1− pG(a))Wt+1],
as well as the boundary conditions
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V B1 = V
b,B (17)
V G1 = V
b,G (18)
V BT = z
b
T (19)
V GT = z
b
T . (20)
Proof. See appendix.
In order to make use of Proposition 3.2, we actually have to be able to calculate
the correspondence Γt(., .) as precisely as possible. This is particularly important for
any numerical application of the recursive formulation. The following proposition
gives a characterization of the theoretical properties of Γt that are indispensable
for a satisfactory approach to calculate Γt numerically. For technical reasons we
distinguish between the case where the utility zt from consuming the UI benefit is
bounded from below, and the case where it is not. We will discuss this and other
issues after stating the proposition.7
Proposition 3.3 (Characterization of Γt) The following formulas characterize
the correspondence Γt(V
B
t , V
G
t ), which produces all feasible policy options for given
entitlements V Bt and V
G
t in period t. Note that we allow for a lower bound z on the
utility value of the benefit zt. The reason for this will be explained in Remark 3.4.
1. Be t ≤ T and let zt ≥ z (where z may take the value −∞). Then there exists
a lower bound V G, so that for V G ≤ V Gt ≤ Wt:
Γt(V
B
t , V
G
t ) =
{
{zt(a), V Bt+1(a), V Gt+1(a)}a∈[a,a](V Bt ,V Gt ) : V Bt ∈ [V Bt (V Gt ), V
B
t (V
G
t )]
∅ : else
(21)
The jointly feasible values zt(a), V
B
t+1(a) and V
G
t+1(a) are differentiable func-
tions.
The boundary functions a(V Bt , V
G
t ), a(V
B
t , V
G
t ) and V
B
t (V
G
t ), V
B
t (V
G
t ) are con-
tinuous. They can depend on the value of z (when zt ≥ z is binding).
For V Gt below V
G, the correspondence Γt(V
B
t , V
G
t ) is the empty set.
7The notation a ∈ [a, a](V Bt , V Gt ) means that the boundaries a and a are functions a(V Bt , V Gt )
and a(V Bt , V
G
t ).
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2. In period T−1 the correspondence ΓT−1(V BT−1, V GT−1) takes the same form as in
1 with only one possible parameter value a, i.e. only one choice {zT−1(a), V BT (a), V GT (a)}.
In the recursive formulation of contract b (Proposition 3.2), the principal has to
choose a three-dimensional vector (zt, V
B
t+1, V
G
t+1) in every period. Proposition 3.3
shows that feasibility restricts the principal’s choice set to a one-dimensional path,
smoothly parameterized through a. Furthermore the support of Γ is a convex set, a
property that is crucial for the numerical implementation.
Two further technical remarks on Proposition can be made: 3.3.
Remark 3.4 The upper bound Wt on V
G
t is artificial: Of course the principal can
ensure lifetime utilities above the value of secure lifetime income from work. How-
ever, this cannot be optimal, since it reduces the search effort to zero, and in view
of Condition 2.3, we exclude lifetime utilities above Wt from our considerations.
Remark 3.5 The lower bound on zt in Proposition 3.3 is introduced for technical
reasons: Some utility functions map onto the real line R, while some only onto
the half-line R+. Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA) are an example of the
former kind and CRRA utility functions with risk aversion smaller than one are an
example of the latter kind.
With Proposition 3.3 at hand, we can precisely define the notion of feasibil-
ity in our model: A pair of entitlements (V Bt , V
G
t ) is called jointly feasible if the
set Γt(V
B
t , V
G
t ) is non-empty. Note that the correspondence Γt maps into the val-
ues of jointly feasible (zt, V
B
t+1, V
G
t+1) (see the last line of Proposition 3.2), means
Γt+1(V
B
t+1, V
G
t+1) is automatically non-empty.
Let us now be more specific as to why this proposition is so important for our
purposes. Models including repeated moral hazard, like ours, have been discussed
in the framework of a strand of literature building on Spear and Srivastava (1987),
Thomas and Worrall (1990), Abreu et al. (1990) [APS], Atkeson and Lucas (1992)
and Chang (1998). The following remark relates Proposition 3.3 to this literature.
Remark 3.6 The sets of jointly feasible entitlements are the finite-dimensional ana-
logue of the set of sequential equilibrium payoffs (of the agents’ game) in the infinite-
dimensional framework of APS or the set of sustainable outcomes in the (again
infinite-dimensional) framework of Chang (1998).
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By introducing entitlements, marginal utilities or sequential equilibrium out-
comes as state variables - instead of “intuitive” state variables - we inevitably run
into the difficulty of precisely defining the sets of possible values these state variables
can take. APS and Chang (1998) characterize these sets as the largest fixed point of
a set operator. Moreover, they show that the fixed point can be obtained by a fixed-
point iteration of sets. This is theoretically sound. However, it does not provide an
entirely satisfactory description of the sets nor the definite algorithm to calculate
them numerically, in particular if the state space is more than one-dimensional. In
fact, the numerical determination of these sets may be a tricky issue in simulations
of models building on these methods. In Proposition 3.3 we give - for our model
- a satisfactory description of the sets of the state variables. The boundaries of
the sets are continuous functions. In particular, the sets are compact, connected
and contractible.8 In the next section we will point out that this is crucial for the
numerical implementation of our solution. Moreover, Proposition 3.3 states that
the principal’s choice problem in a given period is essentially one-dimensional (in
the sense that the correspondence describes a smooth one-dimensional path in the
three-dimensional real space, with this path being parameterized in a).9
After this methodological digression, we return to the solution of the principal’s
problem (ASUI). Proposition 3.2 states (ASUI) as a four-dimensional minimization
problem, a still rather complex problem from a numerical viewpoint. However, as in
the case of standard adverse selection problems (see for example the book by Laffont
and Martimort (2002), Chapter 2), we are able to show that agent B’s entitlement
constraint and agent G’s adverse selection incentive constraint must be binding,
and that agent G’s entitlement constraint must be slack at the solution. And so we
finally characterize the solution to the principal’s problem (ASUI) as follows:
Proposition 3.7 (Solution of the principal’s problem) For values of V that
are not too low, solutions to the principal’s problem are solutions to the simplified
problem:
min
V g,B ,V g,G
qCB1 (V , V
g,G) + (1− q)CG1 (V g,B, V g,G)
s.t. V ≥ V g,B
The qualification “not too low” is needed to avoid corner solutions. In the simu-
lation we found that all values of V corresponding to reasonable levels of insurance
8Here, “contractible” is a term from algebraic topology. Intuitively, a topological space is
contractible if it contains no holes. Formally, all closed loops in the space are homotopic to a single
point.
9Except for the next-to-last period, where there is only one choice left.
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were high enough (compare the proof in the appendix and footnote 11 in subsection
4.1).
Two corollaries: Two corollaries ensue from Proposition 3.7. The setup consid-
ered by Shavell and Weiss (1979) will be our benchmark, i.e. a set-up where the
principal knows the type of the agent and sets the benefits to give optimal search
incentives. We will call this the pure moral hazard environment. About the contract
for type B we learn:
Corollary 3.8 Type B receives the minimal entitlement utility V . His contract is
distorted with respect to the optimal contract in a pure moral hazard environment
such that its value V b,G for type G is reduced.
In the case of the contract for type G, we deduce:
Corollary 3.9
1. Type G receives an information rent, i.e. the utility V g,G that his contract
provides him with is greater than V .
2. If the adverse selection incentive constraint of the bad searcher (12) is slack at
the solution, the good searcher’s contract is identical to the optimal contract
in the pure moral hazard environment (given the level of entitlement V g,G).
In our numerical simulations, we found that the adverse selection incentive con-
straint of the bad searcher (12) was always slack.
We thus recover the rent extraction/efficiency trade-off from a simple adverse selec-
tion model without moral hazard (cf. Chapter 2 of Laffont and Martimort (2002)).
The bad searcher’s contract is distorted and his search effort is not efficient, whereas
the good searcher’s contract is optimal.
The corollaries provide a first step towards a description of how an unemployment
agency should design optimal UI contracts. We will discuss in more detail how
optimal contracts look after the simulation in the next section.
4 Numerical Analysis
4.1 Computational Strategy
The simulation closely follows Propositions 3.2, 3.3 and 3.7 in Section 2. The first
part of the simulation calculates the correspondence Γt by backward induction. As
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in Proposition 3.3, we use the entitlement of agent G, V Gt , as a parameter for the
upper and lower bound on the entitlement V Bt for agent B. We introduce a grid on
V Gt and then calculate the bounds on V
B
t by a bracketing procedure.
More precisely, for a given tuple (V Bt , V
G
t ) of state variables, we check whether
the corresponding path of choice variables (zt(a), V
B
t+1(a), V
G
t+1(a)) (compare the
proof of Proposition 3.3, Appendix C) intersects the set of jointly feasible val-
ues (zt, V
B
t+1, V
G
t+1) as determined in the previous induction step. As defined in
the previous section, by “jointly feasible” we refer to tuples (V Bt+1, V
G
t+1) such that
Γt+1(V
B
t+1, V
G
t+1) is non-empty; in the case of zt, we only have to check whether it is
above the lower bound z. From Proposition 3.3, we know that for each V Gt (within
the limits of feasible entitlements for G) there exits a V Bt (V
G
t ) and V
B
t (V
G
t ) that
limits the range of V Bt jointly feasible with V
G
t . Since for every V
G
t the set of jointly
feasible V Bt is one interval, we can “encircle” V
B
t (and, separately, V
B
t ) by values of
V Bt above and below and then calculate the bound by a (highly precise) bracketing
procedure. Proposition 3.3 thus guarantees that our algorithm calculates a charac-
terization of the set of jointly feasible entitlements (V Bt , V
G
t ) by stating that this set
(V Bt+1, V
G
t+1) is compact and connected.
As we have pointed out in the preceding section (compare Remark 3.6 and the
following discussion), the virtue of Proposition 3.3 lies in a more “precise” char-
acterization of the sets of jointly feasible entitlements (Changs’s set of sustainable
outcomes). It is exactly here in the numerical algorithm where this characterization
becomes useful: The description of the set of sustainable outcomes as a fixed point
of a set operator by Abreu et al. (1990) is mathematically precise, but poses a seri-
ous precision problem in numerical applications with more than one state variable
(compare the discussion in Section 8 of Chang (1998)). As an illustration, Figure 1
shows the support of the correspondence Γ4(V
B
4 , V
G
4 ) in the calibration of our model,
which is described in the following subsection.
The second part of our numerical procedure uses the recursive formulation in
Proposition 3.2. It calculates a numerical approximation of the cost functions
Cit(V
B
t , V
G
t ) based on a solution of the minimization problems in the backward
induction of the principal.
More precisely, we cover the domain of Cit (i.e. the set of jointly feasible enti-
tlements (V Bt , V
G
t ) for which Γt(V
B
t , V
G
t ) is non-empty) by a large grid. For each
tuple (V Bt , V
G
t ) in the grid (“states of the world”), we solve the minimization prob-
lem along the path of choice variables (zt(a), V
B
t+1(a), V
G
t+1(a)), i.e. we solve it in
a. Ignoring the exact value of the limits a and a, we use a bracketing procedure
in which we allocate an extremely high cost to a values delivering choice variables
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outside the set of feasible values. Note that we make use of the characterization of
Γt in two ways: First, we rely on the fact that the set of jointly feasible entitlements
(V Bt , V
G
t ) is compact and contractible.
10 Second, we exploit the reduction of the
number of choice variables from three (zt, V
B
t+1, V
G
t+1) to one a.
Finally, each cost function is then approximated as a linear combination of com-
plete Chebychev polynomials by regression (for this standard procedure, see Judd
(1998), Chapters 6.4, 6.12 and 12.8).
In the third part, the approximated cost functions Ci1 are combined in the ob-
jective function of the principal’s problem. According to proposition 3.7, we have
to solve a two-dimensional minimization problem.11
After an initial grid search, the solution is calculated using a Nelder-Mead mul-
tidimensional minimization procedure.
4.2 Calibration of the Model
In our calibration, we work with a monthly interval. Therefore we set the discount
rate to β = 0.995, which corresponds to an annual discount rate of 0.95. The
overall timeframe is a year, i.e. the number of periods is set to T = 12. As for the
probability function, we choose pi(a) = 1−
√
1− exp(−θia), where θi remains to be
determined. We use CRRA utility functions u(b) = b
1−γ
1−γ , as is common practice in
the UI literature. The corresponding cost function c(.) = u−1(.) meets the convexity
condition (2.1):
c(z) = zα,
where α = 1
1−γ ≥ 1. In addition, Conditions 2.4, 2.6 and 2.8 are fulfilled by the
probability function pi(a).
12 So in particular, the prerequisites of Theorem 3.1 hold
in our numerical setup.
In the benchmark case, following Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997), we set α = 2
(i.e. risk aversion γ = 1
2
), which corresponds to intermediate risk aversion on behalf
of the agents.
10If it were not contractible there could be holes in the set of jointly feasible state vectors
(V Bt , V
G
t ), and we would have to split up the minimization path into several parts - a tedious and
difficult task.
11 There is one point to take care of, though: In order to apply Proposition 3.7, we have to
ensure that the minimal entitlement V is so high that z1 > z (compare the proof in Appendix C)
We ran alternative minimization routines for low values of V , showing that the assertion holds.
12Our probability function pi(a) has a slightly more intricate functional form than the one used
by Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) (pHN (a) = 1−exp(−ra)). We have chosen it because the latter
does not fulfill the Inada condition (cf. Condition 2.4).
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The wage is normalized to be w = 100, so that unemployment benefits become
equal to replacement rates. The lower bound on the UI benefits is set to z = 0, the
lowest possible value taken by CRRA utility functions with 0 < γ < 1. In our sim-
ulation - consistent with the proofs of the propositions - we have normalized utility
from consuming the wage to zero, i.e. all expected lifetime utilities are negative.
Finally, we choose the parameters θ1 = 0.007 and θ2 = 0.017 to match the
escape rates from unemployment under the current US unemployment insurance
system (compare Meyer (1990)). For type B, the bad searcher, this is then 22.7%
per month; for type G, the good searcher, it is 35.8% per month. As a comparison,
Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) find an average weekly escape rate of 10% for the US,
which corresponds to a monthly escape rate of 34.4%. The share of the bad searchers
in the unemployment pool, q, is set equal to 0.5. Other choices of parameters will
be discussed in the next section, where we give a comparative statics analysis.
4.3 Results
In this section, we discuss the optimal contracts in our environment in comparison
to the Shavell-Weiss (SW) pure moral hazard case as well as in comparison with the
first-best, i.e. the case where there is no information problem at all. In all cases, the
information rent of the good searcher is taken into account to make the contracts
comparable.
Figure 2 shows the optimal UI contracts under adverse selection for our choice
of parameters described above. The entitlement bound is V = −25 (we consider
different values below), the lifetime (12 periods) utility of a bad searcher who be-
comes unemployed and receives an replacement rate of 68.4% for six months. In
terms of consumption equivalents, an unemployed bad searcher would be as well off
if he consumed (a constant) 61.76% of the market wage w = 100 for the rest of his
life.
The solution is to separate types since Theorem 3.1 applies. The incentive con-
straint of agent B, equation 12, is slack, and the contract g - designed for the good
searcher G according to Corollary 3.9 - is falling and identical to the one consid-
ered by Shavell and Weiss (1979). Contract b is rather flat. As well as agent B’s
effort choices it is distorted relative to agent B’s SW contract (which is falling, pure
moral hazard case, Figure 4), as stated in Corollary 3.8. Of course, the first-best
contracts, where the principal knows the type of the agents and can set their effort
choices, are flat (full insurance, Figure 6) and their levels are determined by the
initial entitlements of agents B and G.
Figures 3, 5 and 7 show the equilibrium job-finding probabilities of agents B
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and G, corresponding to the contracts with adverse selection (Figure 3), the SW
contracts (Figure 5) and the first best contracts (Figure 7) respectively. As for a
comparison of our adverse selection model and second the SW contract, we know
that the good searcher gets the same contract with or without adverse selection, and
so his reemployment probabilities do not differ. This is markedly different for Agent
B, whose reemployment probability is on average 32.7% higher for the SW contract.
Furthermore, the profile of reemployment probabilities is (slightly) hump-shaped
with adverse selection (whereas it is of course decreasing without adverse selection).
Recall that it is the SW contract which sets the search incentives optimally. The
relatively flat profile for B in our adverse selection case induces a lower search effort
in comparison to the pure moral hazard case (but helps to save information rent).
Note that in the first-best contract, the effort choices and reemployment probabilities
fall over time. This can be explained by the finite time horizon: The closer the
death of the agent, the less valuable is the exit from unemployment, and so the
principal prefers not to impose a strong (and costly) effort. Observe, however, that
the reemployment probabilities in the first-best case are considerably higher than in
the two other cases.
More generally, the size of the distortions and the precise shape of contract b are
determined by two effects:
1. A moral hazard effect (MH), arising, as in the case of type G, from the agents’
search problem,
2. An adverse selection effect (AS), arising from the principal’s wish to lower the
value of the contract for type G (compare Corollary 3.8) in order to separate
the types.
We know that in the pure MH environment, benefit schemes are falling. What
would agent B’s contract look like in a pure AS environment? For the latter, we
consider a setup where the type of an agent is still hidden information, but the
probabilities of remaining unemployed of types B and G are fixed constants pB > pG.
This is then a typical adverse selection problem, as discussed in Chapter 2 of Laffont
and Martimort (2002). Due to the assumption of full commitment, the dynamics
of the contracts are rather simple. Now, as in the case of the full problem (see
Corollary 3.9), agent G receives an information rent, and, given the entitlement
V g,G, his contract is the first-best contract. In the pure AS case, this means his
consumption is fully smoothed. As in the full problem the following Spence-Mirrlees
property holds:
∂V Bt
∂zt+s
− ∂V
G
t
∂zt+s
> 0 ∀s ≥ 1.
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Table 1: Information Rents Obtained by Agent G
V Certainty Equivalent q = 0.2 q = 0.5 q = 0.8
-35 49.03 10.8 % 18.1 % 22.2 %
-30 55.21 7.3 % 13.9 % 17.0 %
-20 68.67 3.1 % 7.2 % 9.9 %
Rents are expressed as a percentage increase over the minimal entitlement
Table 2: Elasticities of Unemployment Probability w.r.t. Benefit Level for
Agent B
V Certainty Equivalent θB = 0.004 θB = 0.007 θB = 0.010
-35 49.03 0.0070 0.0116 0.0167
-30 55.21 0.0075 0.0131 0.0188
-20 68.67 0.0083 0.0146 0.0209
Therefore, in order to separate the two types, the contract for agent B has to
show an increasing benefit scheme.13 In our benchmark calibration both effects
cancel each other out and thus contract b is flat.
In the rest of this section we explore the dependence of the optimal contracts on
different choices of parameters. In particular, we discuss the influence of different
parameters on the relative weight of the MH and the AS effects. For all parameter
values the incentive constraint of agent B is slack, and contract g is determined
through moral hazard only and is therefore falling (for a detailed numerical discus-
sion of the comparative statics of the contract in a pure moral hazard environment,
see Pavoni (forthcoming)). However, the level of entitlement for G (and so, in par-
ticular, his information rent) and contract b vary with the parameters of our model.
The entitlement bound V : For the good searcher, a decrease in entitlement
shifts his contract g uniformly downwards. For contract b, Figures 2, 8 and 9
13A formal derivation of the solution to the principal’s problem in a pure adverse selection
environment is available upon request.
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(entitlement bounds of V = −25, V = −20 and V = −30) show that the profile
is downward-sloping for high entitlement bounds V and upward sloping for low
entitlement bounds V . The reason is that the MH effect prevails for high entitlement
bounds V and the AS effect dominates for low entitlement bounds V . At the same
time, according to Table 1, the information rent for agent G increases as V falls.
These results are due to the following considerations of the principal. At low
levels of V , providing strong incentives does not save many costs since transfers are
already low. Thus the MH effect is less important and the AS effect dominates. At
high levels of V on the other hand, strong incentives are important as they save a
large amount of money. Therefore the MH effect dominates.
There is another mechanism that reinforces the MH effect as V increases (but
is quantitatively less important). As can be seen from Table 2, the elasticity of the
probability of remaining unemployed σipi(z) with respect to UI benefits increases in
the entitlement level. This means that at higher levels of utility, a reduction in
future benefits has a greater effect on the search effort and thus the reemployment
chances of the unemployed agent. Hence MH considerations for the bad searcher
matter relatively more than AS effects at higher levels of utility.
A flatter contract b (because of a lower V ) is more attractive to the risk-averse
agent G than a steeper contract b (at a high level of V ). Since agents are optimally
separated in equilibrium, the principal has to grant G a higher information rent
from his contract g when B gets a flatter profile because of a lower V .
There are three remaining parameters with intuitive comparative statics.14
The share of type B agents q: As the share of the bad searcher’s q increases,
contract b gradually shifts from a contract dominated by the AS effect to one dom-
inated by the MH effect. The contract for the good searcher is uniformly shifted
upwards. Moreover, from Table 1 we can see that his information rent also rises.
If the proportion of type B agents is high, then reducing the costs arising from
their contract b dominates the principal’s problem and the issue of paying an infor-
mation rent to type G agents becomes less important. In order to keep the costs of
contract b low, the distortion of contract b away from its first best is reduced. That
is, the MH effect dominates and G’s information rent increases.
If on the other hand the proportion of type B agents is low, keeping information
rents for G low is the primary objective of the principal. Setting incentives for agent
B is then less of a concern, i.e. the MH effect is of minor importance.
14The working paper version contains numerous figures that graphically show the effects dis-
cussed subsequently.
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Table 3: Information Rents Obtained by Agent G
V Certainty Equivalent θB = 0.004 θB = 0.007 θB = 0.010
-35 49.03 20.6 % 18.1 % 14.2 %
-30 55.21 14.3 % 13.9 % 10.9 %
-20 68.67 6.6 % 7.2 % 6.2 %
(rents expressed as percentage increase over minimal entitlement)
Agent B’s unemployment probability parameter θB: The parameter θB de-
termines the search capacity of agent B. The higher it is, the lower is his probability
of remaining unemployed, given the same search effort a. What happens if we keep
θG = 0.017 constant and gradually increase θB?
Two extreme cases can help us to understand the economic forces at work. If
θB is zero, setting incentives is ineffective and there is no MH effect at all. As θB
increases and approaches θG, the two contracts b and g become increasingly similar
and eventually identical to the optimal contract in a pure MH setup. Thus, the
AS effect vanishes. Obviously, the shift in the principal’s focus from AS to MH is
monotone in θB. Therefore, for low values of θB the AS effect dominates, whereas
for high values the MH effect is dominant.
Risk aversion α−1
α
: The exponent in the cost function α determines the risk
aversion of both agents. The coefficient of relative risk aversion is α−1
α
.
A higher level of risk aversion has two effects. First, one immediate consequence
of a higher risk aversion is that optimal contracts become flatter since agents have
a stronger preference for intertemporal consumption-smoothing (numbers available
upon request). The second effect, namely that G receives a higher information rent
as risk aversion increases, is a consequence of this. To see this, recall that a flatter
profile for agent B implies that his contract b becomes more attractive for agent G.
Since it is optimal to separate agents in equilibrium, the principal has to grant G a
higher information rent from the contract g designed for him when agent B gets a
flatter profile in order to separate the agents.
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5 Extensions
In this section we want to discuss two possible extensions of our model. A first
extension concerns the (minimal) entitlement V for the unemployed, which could
be type-dependent. Second, we show how to integrate UI taxes which are paid after
reemployment (following Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997)).
Type dependent entitlement constraint: We show in this subsection that we
can compute the optimal contract without our assumption that both types (good
and bad searchers) have the same entitlement constraint. To organize this discussion
we draw on subsection 3.3.1 of Laffont and Martimort (2002), where the optimal
contract is characterized in a static environment and for arbitrary entitlement con-
straints.15 Laffont and Martimort (2002) show that the solution can be described
through five cases, characterized by different combinations of participation and in-
centive constraints that are binding at the optimal solution.
Case 1 is identical to the one we have found here. The entitlement constraints
of the bad searcher and the incentive constraint of the good searcher are binding.
In Cases 2-5, the minimal entitlement of agent G, V G, is greater than V
g,G and
thus, by Corollary 3.9, greater than the entitlement of agent B, V B.
16 As the wedge
between V B and V G widens, the entitlement constraint of B and finally the incentive
constraint of agent B become binding. Moreover, the incentive constraint of agent G
and finally the entitlement constraint of agent B become slack. The characterization
of Laffont and Martimort (2002) shows that this description is correct.
In Case 2, both entitlement constraints and the good searcher’s incentive con-
straint are binding. In Case 3, both entitlement constraints and no incentive con-
straints are binding. In Case 4, both entitlement constraints and type B’s incentive
constraint are binding. In Case 5, type G’s entitlement and type B’s incentive
constraint are binding.
A characterization of which constraints are binding or slack in terms of primitives
seems untractable in our dynamic model due to the highly non-linear dependence of
the entitlements on the parameters of the problem. Instead, we conduct a numerical
analysis. We pick the value of V B = −30 and choose a higher number for V G > V g,G
15The entitlement constraints in our model technically correspond to participation constraints
in the adverse selection models analyzed in classical contract theory. The case of type-dependent
reservation utility in participation constraints has been widely discussed in that context, the most
general work being the article by Jullien (2000).
16Since the entitlement constraint of agent G is slack in our optimal solution, any value for agent
G’s entitlement lower than V g,G does not change the solution.
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(for the case of V B = V G = −30 (adverse selection), compare Figure 8). We then
compute for each case, the (constrained) optimal solution under the assumption
that Case 1-5 are true. For example for Case 5, we minimize the principal’s cost
under the assumption that type G’s entitlement and type B’s incentive constraint
are binding. This results in five cost levels for the principal, one for each case. The
optimal contract is then the one with the lowest cost level.
We illustrate this procedure for two different levels of V G, −15 and −22. For
V G = −22 (which corresponds to 65.86% of certainty equivalent consumption), we
find that both entitlement constraints and no incentive constraints are binding (case
3). The optimal contract for the good and the bad searcher is then equal to the
contract with moral hazard only (the SW contract, see subsection 4.3).17 The case
is depicted in Figure 10. For the higher value V G = −15 (75.96% of certainty
equivalent consumption), type G’s entitlement and type B’s incentive constraint are
binding (Case 5) (see Figure 11).
Taxes on wages: Shavell and Weiss (1979) analyze the optimal allocation of UI
benefits with one representative agent; Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) add taxes on
labor income after reemployment to this analysis. They make the simplifying as-
sumption that the tax rate is fixed for the rest of their life the moment agents have
gained reemployment. In our model we follow Shavell and Weiss (1979), but it is the-
oretically straightforward to extend it to the framework of Hopenhayn and Nicolini
(1997). By taxing (or subsidizing) labor income the principal can completely control
the agent’s consumption when he is employed. The additional ability of the princi-
pal to tax the agent can thus be captured by the introduction of entitlements while
employed, Wt, which take the role of additional state variables, and a value function
for transfers that corresponds to the cost function in the recursive formulation of
the UI contract in the SW model. In our model we would have to introduce two
additional state variables for each contract i, W i,B and W i,G. These state variables
are the entitlement utility of an employed agent under contract i. Since the wage
rate is known, the tax rate can be computed once W i is known and vice versa.
Although it is easy to write down this extension, there is a numerical problem.
In Proposition 3.7 we showed that the principal’s problem involves only two state
variables instead of four variables as in the original problem. This reduction of the
state space is crucial since with more state variables, the curse of dimensionality
17The replacement rate is higher than 100% in some periods. This reflects the fact that our
model does not incorporate the effects of UI on work effort and its impact on employment.
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kicks in. This is what would happen now if we allowed wages to be taxed.
In the recursive formulation of contract b (and g likewise) given by Proposition
3.2, the additional state variables W i,B and W i,G enter into the cost functions of the
principal and - as choice variables - into the minimization problem in the backward
induction. While the values of the transfers after the agent’s reemployment are
easily calculated, the approximation of the cost function poses a serious numerical
problem. This is because it takes now four state variables (for every contract,
two from the original problem plus the two additional state variables W i,B and
W i,G). The curse of dimensionality then becomes a serious problem (see Chapter
6 of Judd (1998)). The other steps of the computation, the minimization problem
of the principal (Proposition 3.7) and the choice problem (characterized as one-
dimensional in Proposition 3.3) do not pose a serious problem. Only the dimension
of the state space of the cost function can prevent computation.
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Appendix
A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2.7
Proof. Firstly, we prove that pB(a
B
t ) > pG(a
G
t ) ensues from the Spence-Mirrlees
Property 7. We calculate
∂V it
∂zt+1
= βpi(a
i
t)
∂V it+1
∂zt+1
= βpi(a
i
t),
where we use the Envelope Theorem. The assertion now follows immediately.
Secondly, assume that pB(a
B
t ) > pG(a
G
t ) holds. In the case where s = 1, the
Spence-Mirrlees property follows from what we have shown above. So let s > 1.
Then
∂V Bt
∂zt+s
− ∂V
G
t
∂zt+s
= βpB
∂V Bt+1
∂zt+s
− βpG∂V
G
t+1
∂zt+s
,
where we have used the Envelope Theorem once more. The assertion follows by
induction.
Proof of Theorem 3.1
Proof. It is clear that there is a solution to the principal’s problem. Let assump-
tion 2.8 hold. We prove the second assertion by contradiction: Assume that the
principal’s problem is solved by one contract p, {zP1 , ..., zPT−1, zPT }, for both agents,
this generates a total expected utility of V Bt and V
G
t in period t for agents B and G
respectively.
We have a look at the “first best” solutions for the last two periods that generate
the same utilities V BT−1 and V
G
T−1 as p. As a “first best” solution, we refer to the
solution of the pure moral hazard problem as considered by Shavell andWeiss (1979),
i.e. the problem of guaranteeing agent i a utility of V iT−1 at the lowest cost. This is
stated as follows:
minziT−1,ziT c(z
i
T−1) + βpi(a
i)c(ziT )
s.t. V iT−1 = z
i
T−1 − ai + β[p(ai)ziT + (1− p(ai))u(w)]
1 = βp′i(a
i)[ziT − u(w)]
This is the two-period cost minimization problem (the principal’s problem in this
framework) in the case of agent i, subject to the promise-keeping constraint and
the first order condition of the agent’s problem, determining the choice of effort ai.
Plugging the entitlement constraint into the objective function and making use of
the Enveloppe Theorem, we calculate the following first order conditions for the
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principal with respect to zT (we abbreviate pi = pi(a
i)):
c′(zBT−1) = −
(p′B)
3
pBp′′B
c(zBT ) + c
′(zBT ) (22)
c′(zGT−1) = −
(p′G)
3
pGp′′G
c(zBT ) + c
′(zBT ). (23)
The factor of the cost function on the right-hand side (RHS) is
−(p
′
i)
3
pip′′i
=
1
pii(zT )
∂pii(zT )
∂zT
,
and so we see that the RHS is identical to the relative expected marginal cost. By
Condition 2.8, part 1, we know that the factor of the cost function is higher for
agent G than for agent B for a given zT . By its second part we know that this has
to hold in equilibrium, too, and so the RHS is greater for agent G than for agent
B.18 We may therefore deduce that the SW contract of agent B is flatter than its
counterpart for agent G, where we define “flatter” in the following sense:
zGT−1
zGT
>
zBT−1
zBT
.
In the following we will discuss the last two periods of the pooling contract only
and show that it cannot be optimal to offer it to both agents. We will refer to the
first-best solutions as SW contracts.
First, suppose that the pooling contract p is flatter than the SW contract of
agent G. Then the principal can offer p and a second contract g’ that is identical
to contract p except for the last two periods, where zPT−1 and z
P
T are substituted
by zGT−1 and z
G
T−1 from the SW contract. This is incentive-compatible: Agent G
is indifferent between p and g’ by construction. Suppose that agent B (weakly)
preferred g’ over p. Then for period 1 to T − 2, he can exert the same effort ag1 to
agT−2 (i.e. that he chooses in the case of contract g’) when facing contract p, and thus
the stochastically discounted utility from the benefits z1 to zT−2 is identical for both
contracts. In the last two periods, in contrast, agent B - exerting effort optimally
- gains a higher utility from the flatter contract p than from contract g’ because of
the Spence-Mirrlees property (cf. Lemma 2.7). So agent B cannot prefer g’ over p.
Offering the two contracts p and g’ is also cheaper for the principal, because g’ is
the (unique) cost-optimizing contract for agent G during the last two periods. This
is a contradiction.
18Note that we could weaken Condition 2.8: To ensure that the RHS of G is higher than the
RHS of B it is sufficient to assume that the relative marginal probability of remaining unemployed
1
pii(z)
∂pii(z)
∂z is higher for agent G than for agent B.
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Second, suppose that the pooling contract p is identical to or steeper than the
SW contract of agent G. The principal then offers p and a second contract b’ that
is identical to contract p with zPT−1 and z
P
T substituted by z
B
T−1 and z
B
T from the SW
contract. Since the SW contract of agent B is flatter than the SW contract of agent
G, as we have seen, we can infer the contradiction in the same way as in the first
case.
Proof of Proposition 3.2
We restate the problem of offering unemployment insurance contracts to unemployed
agents (ASUI):
min
{zb1,...,zbT },{zg1 ,...,zgT }
q[c(zb1) + βpB(aˆ
B
1 )[c(z
b
2) + βpB(aˆ
B
2 )[c(z
b
3) + ...]...]] +
(1− q)[c(zg1) + βpG(aˆG1 )[c(zg2) + βpG(aˆG2 )[c(zg3) + ...]...]]
subject to the entitlement constraints (EC)
V b,B1 ≥ V , (24)
V g,G1 ≥ V , (25)
the adverse selection incentive constraints (AS-IC)
V b,B1 ≥ V g,B1 , (26)
V g,G1 ≥ V b,G1 . (27)
and subject to the choice of effort by the agents.
We can now begin the proof of Proposition 3.2.
Proof. First, we give a formal definition of Γt(V
i,B
t , V
i,G
t ). Recall that
V i,jt = z
i
t− aˆi,jt +β(pj(aˆi,jt )[zit+1− aˆi,jt+1+β(pj(aˆi,jt+1)[...]+ ...)]+(1−pj(aˆi,jt ))Wt), (28)
where i denotes the type of contract, j the type of agent and aˆi,jt the choice of
effort by agent j, given contract i at time t. Then the formal definition of Γt is
straightforward:
Γt(V
i,B
t , V
i,G
t ) = {(zit, V i,Bt+1 , V i,Gt+1) | ∃(zit, zˆit+1, ..., zˆiT )s.t. j ∈ {B,G}
V i,jt = z
i
t − aˆi,jt + β(pj(aˆi,jt )[zˆt+1...]...) ∧
V i,jt = z
i
t − aˆi,jt + β(pj(aˆi,jt )V i,jt+1 + (1− pj(aˆi,jt )Wt)}.
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In other words: The correspondence Γt maps a pair of state variables (V
i,B
t , V
i,G
t )
in a given period t onto all triples (zt, V
i,B
t+1 , V
i,G
t+1) (where zt denotes current utility
and V i,jt+1 promised utilities) to which a contract (zt, ..., zˆT ) exists that generates the
corresponding lifetime utilities for agents B and G. Note that Γt(V
i,B
t , V
i,G
t ) can be
empty, because for some values of (V i,Bt , V
i,G
t ) of pairs of lifetime utilities of B and
of G, there might be no sustaining contract.
Note also that the support of Γt is the “largest” set of pairs of lifetime utilities
- all possible contracts are represented. Thus, adding the constraint
Γ1(V
b,B, V b,G) 6= ∅ Γ1(V g,B, V g,G) 6= ∅,
to ASUI does not change the problem - it simply means adding an empty constraint.
Therefore we can reformulate ASUI as follows:
min
(V b,B ,V b,G,V g,B ,V g,G)
(
min
{zb1,...,zbT },{zg1 ,...,zgT }
q[c(zb1) + βpB(aˆ
b,B
1 )[c(z
b
2) + βpB(aˆ
b,B
2 )[c(z
b
3) + ...]...]] +
(1− q)[c(zg1) + βpG(aˆg,G1 )[c(zg2) + βpG(aˆg,G2 )[c(zg3) + ...]...]]
)
subject to
Γ1(V
b,B, V b,G) 6= ∅ Γ1(V g,B, V g,G) 6= ∅, (29)
subject to (EC)
V b,B1 ≥ V , (30)
V g,G1 ≥ V , (31)
and subject to (AS-IC)
V b,B1 ≥ V g,B1 , (32)
V g,G1 ≥ V b,G1 . (33)
The additional minimization over (V b,B, V b,G, V g,B, V g,G), together with the ad-
ditional constraint (29) is empty since we allow for all pairs of utilities that corre-
spond to a contract.
In this formulation we have dropped the implicit constraint on the choice of
(zb1, ..., z
b
T ) and (z
g
1 , ..., z
g
T ) by definition (28) of V
b,B
1 , V
b,G
1 , V
g,B
1 and V
g,G
1 . As we
have stated above, this is an empty constraint because we minimize over all pairs
(V b,B1 , V
b,G
1 ) and (V
g,B
1 , V
g,G
1 ), to which a corresponding b and g exists.
We can decompose the objective function in the inner minimization problem into
the sum of two separate minimization problems:
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min
{zb1,...,zbT }
q[c(zb1) + βpB(aˆ
B
1 )[c(z
b
2) + βpB(aˆ
B
2 )[c(z
b
3) + ...]...]] +
min
{zg1 ,...,zgT }
(1− q)[c(zg1) + βpG(aˆG1 )[c(zg2) + βpG(aˆG2 )[c(zg3) + ...]...]]
This is because inside the brackets there is no interdependence of the two sum-
mands of the objective function or the implicit constraints (28).
Finally, we are left to show that the recursive formulation (16) of the contract
problem solves the minimization problem
min
{zb1,...,zbT }
c(zb1) + βpB(aˆ
B
1 )[c(z
b
2) + βpB(aˆ
B
2 )[c(z
b
3) + ...]...] (34)
subject to
V b,B = zb1 − aˆb,B1 + β(pB(aˆb,B1 )[zb2 − aˆb,B2 + β(pB(aˆb,B2 )[...] + ...)] + (1− pB(aˆb,B1 ))W1)
V b,G = zb1 − aˆb,G1 + β(pG(aˆb,G1 )[zb2 − aˆb,G2 + β(pG(aˆb,G2 )[...] + ...)] + (1− pG(aˆb,G1 ))W1)
and the choice of effort by the agents CE (compare 2).
We prove the claim by induction over the number of periods T .
For T = 2 we have to show that the following two formulations are equivalent:
min
{zb1,zb2}
c(zb1) + βpB(aˆ
B
1 )c(z
b
2)
s.t.
V b,B = zb1 − aˆb,B1 + β(pB(aˆb,B1 )zb2 + (1− pB(aˆb,B1 ))u(w))
V b,G = zb1 − aˆb,G1 + β(pG(aˆb,G1 )zb2 + (1− pG(aˆb,G1 ))u(w))
CE
and
CB1 (V
b,B, V b,G) = min
{z1,V b,B2 ,V b,G2 }∈Γ1(V b,B ,V b,G)
c(zt) + βpB(a
B)CB2 (V
b,B
2 , V
b,G
2 )
s.t.
V b,B = z1 − aˆb,B1 + β[pB(aˆb,B1 )V b,B2 + (1− pB(aˆb,B1 ))u(w)]
V b,G = z1 − aˆb,G1 + β[pG(aˆb,G1 )V b,G2 + (1− pG(aˆb,G1 ))u(w)]
CE
V b,B2 = V
b,G
2 = z
b
2.
34
Recall that the last constraint is due to the death of the agents at the end of
period T = 2. Substituting zb2 for V
b,B
2 and V
b,G
2 and c(z
b
2) for C
B
2 (V
b,B
2 , V
b,G
2 ) delivers
the equivalence.
Now assume the claim holds for T − 1. Then the problem 34 for T periods can
be rewritten as
min
{zb1}
c(zb1) + βpB(aˆ
B
1 )
(
min
{zb2,...,zbT }
c(zb2) + βpB(aˆ
B
2 )[c(z
b
3) + ...]...
)
s.t.
V b,B = zb1 − aˆb,B1 + β(pB(aˆb,B1 )V b,B2 + (1− pB(aˆb,B1 ))W1)
V b,G = zb1 − aˆb,G1 + β(pG(aˆb,G1 )V b,G2 + (1− pG(aˆb,G1 ))W1)
CE
Note that all we have done is:
1. to split up the summation in the objective function
2. to separate the choice variable zb1 from the other choice variables z
b
2, ..., z
b
T
3. to reformulate the constraints in terms of the lifetime utilities V i,jt as defined
by equation 28.
By using the induction hypothesis we may identify the variables V b,B2 and V
b,G
2
with the state variables and the term in the brackets with the recursive cost func-
tion C2(V
b,B
2 , V
b,G
2 ) of the T − 1 version of the problem. Limiting the choice of
(zb1, V
b,B
2 , V
b,G
2 ) to elements of Γ1(V
b,B, V b,G) ensures by construction of Γ that the
former correspond to feasible contracts (zb1, z
b
2, ..., z
b
T ). This effectively proves the
theorem.
Proof of Proposition 3.3
Proof. In order to simplify the proof we introduce a normalization: The utility
from consuming the wage w is set to zero. Thus, all Wt become zero too, and the
entitlement utilities of the unemployed agents take non-positive values. Note that
the lower bounds for the entitlements, stemming from the lower bound on the benefit
utility z, thus shift downward each period along the backward induction.
First, we look at the agents’ problem. Recall it takes the form
V it = max
a
zt − a+ β[pi(a)V it+1 + (1− pi(a))Wt+1].
Given our normalization, we obtain the following first order condition at an interior
solution:
p′i(a
i
t) =
1
βV it+1
(35)
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By using the Inada condition in Condition 2.4 we ensure that the interior solution
always applies.
The case of t = T− 1: We start with the case of Γt(V Bt , V Gt ) with t = T − 1.
Mathematically speaking, the next-to-last period is different from the previous ones
in that there is an additional constraint on the choice variables V iT : the boundary
conditions 19, 20, namely V BT = V
G
T = zT . This is the very reason why, given the
pair of state variables (V BT−1, V
G
T−1), there is only one choice left for the principal.
First, let us look at the Law of Motion (LOM) for the state variables V BT−1 and V
G
T−1:
zT−1 − aBT−1 + βpB(aBT−1)V BT = V BT−1,
zT−1 − aGT−1 + βpG(aGT−1)V GT = V GT−1,
where we will drop the time index from the effort variables aiT−1. In the following,
we will denote the difference between the entitlements of the agents by:
∆t := V
G
t − V Bt . (36)
With this new notation, and remembering both our normalization and V iT = zT , we
solve the LOM for zT−1, equalize both equations and solve for ∆T−1:
∆T−1 = aB − aG + βpG(aG)zT − βpB(aB)zT (37)
We want to further simplify equation 37. In the next-to-last period, the first order
condition of the agents’ problem (35) takes the following form
p′B(a
B) = p′G(a
G) =
1
βzT
. (38)
Again by using Condition 2.4, the p′i are strictly increasing functions
p′i : (0,∞) −→ (−∞, 0).
Remark A.1 Given Condition 2.3, the principal will never promise an entitlement
above Wt (= 0 under our normalization), since at Wt the agents stop searching (i.e.
ait = 0) and their probability of remaining unemployed becomes pi(a
i
t) = 1.
Thus in particular V iT = zT < 0.
From this we deduce that the p′i are one-to-one and onto. Therefore the following
function γ(aG) is well-defined:
γ(aG) := (p′B)
−1 ◦ p′G(aG).
Now we have everything at hand to define ∆T−1 as a function of aG:
36
∆T−1(aG) = γ(aG)− aG + pG(a
G)− pB(γ(aG))
p′G(aG)
(39)
In order to show point 3 of Proposition 3.3, we have to demonstrate that ∆T−1(.)
is invertible.
We do so by proving:
∆′T−1(a
G) > 0. (40)
Using the agents’ first order condition 35 and
γ′(aG) =
p′′G(a
G)
p′′B(γ(aG))
we calculate
∆′T−1(a
G) = [pB(γ(a
G))− pG(aG)] p
′′
G(a
G)
(p′G(aG))2
. (41)
By Condition 2.4 we know that p′′G(.) > 0, and since pB(γ(a
G)) > pG(a
G) by Condi-
tion 2.6, assertion 40 follows.
Finally we observe that, again by Condition 2.4:
lim
aG→0
∆T−1(aG) = 0. (42)
Together with 40 we deduce that as agent B’s entitlement V BT−1 approaches agent
G’s one V GT−1, the effort of the agent G a
G (as well as the effort of agent B) goes to
zero. Because of 35 this means that the benefit for the last period zT has to converge
to zero, i.e. the wage consumption utility.
Summarizing our results so far, we can state the following: Given entitlements
V BT−1 and V
G
T−1 such that ∆T−1 ≥ 0, we can find a unique corresponding choice
of effort by agent G aG (for the time being, we neglect the lower bound z on the
benefits zt). From this we can calculate - uniquely - the choice of effort by agent B
aB and the benefit for the last period zT from equation 35, and the benefit of the
next to last period zT−1 from LOM. All these functions are differentiable. As ∆T−1
goes to zero, the benefit of the last period zT goes to zero, i.e. the cost of the benefit
converges to that of the wage.
We finally have to look at the set of feasible entitlements V BT−1 and V
G
T−1. If
z = −∞, so z can take any value, we infer from 42 that the upper bound V Bt (.) on
V Bt , given V
G
t , is
V
B
t (V
G
t ) = V
G
t .
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As for the lower bound, we calculate
V Bt (V
G
t ) = lim
aG→∞
V Gt −∆T−1(aG).
Now let z > −∞. Then there is a natural lower bound V GT−1, namely the stochasti-
cally discounted sum of the bounds on zT−1 and zT . Given V GT−1 ∈ [V GT−1, 0] we now
have to prove that there is a lower and an upper bound V BT−1(V
G
T−1) and V
B
T−1(V
G
T−1)
on the corresponding feasible V BT−1. Because of 35, the lower bound on zT translates
into an upper bound aG on the corresponding choices of effort of agent G. It is
attained with equality. By 36 and 40 we find the lower bound
V BT−1(V
G
T−1) = V
G
T−1 −∆T−1(aG).
As for the upper bound V
B
T−1(V
G
T−1), one can see intuitively that V
B
T−1 is bounded by
V GT−1 (for a rigorous argument, see point 1 in the proof of 3.7). However, V
B
T−1 does
not necessarily attain this bound because of an additional constraint: zT−1 ≥ z.
From the LOM and 35 we know
zT−1 = V GT−1 + a
G − pi(a
G)
p′i(aG)
The RHS is increasing in aG, so a lower bound on zT−1 implies a lower bound on the
effort of the second type, aG (note that because of our normalization, the reference
points for each period have been shifted downwards). Because of 40, a lower bound
on ∆T−1 ensues. Given V GT−1, we thus find the upper bound on V
B
T−1:
V
B
T−1(V
G
T−1) = V
G
T−1 −∆T−1(aG).
We see that V BT−1 attains V
G
T−1 only if the lower bound a
G becomes zero (the smallest
possible effort). Since ∆T−1(.) is an increasing function, we see that all values
V BT−1 ∈ [V BT−1, V
B
t−1] are attainable as long as a
G > aG. This must be the case for
V GT−1 ≥ V GT−1, since then there are corresponding benefit values zT−1, zT such that
zi ≥ z. Finally, because of the Theorem of the Maximum, both aT−1 and aT−1
depend continuously on V GT−1, and since ∆T−1 is a smooth function, the lower and
the upper bound V BT−1 and V
B
T−1 are continuous functions of V
G
T−1.
So for period T − 1, we have shown that the set of feasible values takes the form
stated in the theorem. Note in particular that this set is compact and connected.
The case of t ≤ T− 2: In this subsection, we prove assertion 1. As stated above,
the crucial difference between the next-to-last period and the previous ones is the
boundary condition of the last periods 19 and 20. Before, for every feasible pair
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of state variables (V BT−1, V
G
T−1) - or more precisely, for the difference of these state
variables ∆T−1 - one corresponding choice of effort aGT−1 existed that determined all
choice variables (zT−1, V BT , V
G
T ). As we will see below, for each pair of feasible state
variables (V Bt−1, V
G
t−1) (again, more precisely, to the difference of these state variables
∆t−1) there is a line of possible choices of effort aGt−1 that parameterizes a compact
and connected path of choice variables (zt−1(.), V Bt (.), V
G
t (.)).
We have a look at the LOM once more. With the help of the agents’ first order
condition we transform it into
zt − aB + pB(a
B)
p′B(aB)
= V Bt ,
zt − aG + pG(a
G)
p′G(aG)
= V Gt ,
where again we have dropped the time index from ait. This inspires the definition of
the following functions (i = 1, 2)
fi(a
i) = ai − pi(a
i)
p′i(ai)
.
From the LOM we can now derive a necessary equation for the choice variables (as
represented by the ais, replacing the V it s) to hold:
∆t + fG(a
G) = fB(a
B), (43)
where we have used definition 36.
Let us have a closer look now at fi. From
f ′i =
pip
′′
i
(p′i)2
> 0 (44)
we can see that it is a strictly increasing function (bearing in mind Condition 2.4).
Moreover, we calculate
lim
ai→0
fi(a
i) = 0, (45)
lim
ai→∞
fi(a
i) = ∞. (46)
Now note that there is a natural lower bound V Gt on each V
G
t , namely the stochas-
tically discounted sum of the ztˆs (where tˆ = t, ..., T ). In the case of T − 1, we have
shown that the set of jointly feasible values V BT−1, V
G
T−1 takes the form stated in the
theorem. So let Γt(V
B
t , V
G
t ) be non-empty and take the form of a path in the space
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(zt, V
B
t+1, V
G
t+1) for V
B
t ∈ [V Bt (V Gt ), V Bt (V Gt )] with V Gt ≥ V Gt . We have to show first
that Γt−1(V Bt−1, V
G
t−1) is then non-empty for V
B
t−1 ∈ [V Bt−1(V Gt ), V Bt−1(V Gt )] for some
continuous functions V Bt−1, V
B
t−1 when V
G
t−1 ≥ V Gt−1, and takes the form of a path in
(zt−1, V Bt , V
G
t ).
Put differently, we have to ask for which pairs (V Bt−1, V
G
t−1) are there choice vari-
ables (zt−1, V Bt , V
G
t ) that are jointly feasible. By the agents’ first order condition
(35) we can replace V Bt and V
G
t by the corresponding choices of effort a
B
t−1 and a
G
t−1
(we will drop the time index in the sequel). The effort choices aB and aG have to
satisfy equation 43. Since ∆t−1 ≥ 0 and by 44, 45 and 46, for all aG ≥ 0 we can
find a corresponding aB ≥ 0. By the LOM, we can furthermore determine zt−1
once aG is given. Thus the number of choice variables (zt−1(aG), V Bt (a
G), V Gt (a
G)) is
reduced to the “choice” variable aG. All functions are combinations of differentiable
functions and thus differentiable. The curve φ∆t−1 , which is parameterized in a
G, is
defined as the projection of the triple of choice variables into the two-dimensional
space (V Bt (a
G), V Gt (a
G)).
We have reduced the choice problem to one variable, but in which aG corresponds
to feasible triples (zt−1, V Bt , V
G
t )? First we look at the constraint zt−1 ≥ z. As in
the preceding subsection, by using the LOM
zt−1 = V Gt−1 + fG(a
G)
it translates into a constraint19
aG ≥ aG =
{
f−1G (z − V Gt−1) : V Gt−1 ≤ z
0 : V Gt−1 > z
(47)
Second we have to ask: Which of the pairs of entitlements (V Bt (a
G), V Gt (a
G)) are
feasible? The answer is, those for which Γt(V
B
t , V
G
t ) is non-empty. In other words:
Given V Bt−1 and V
G
t−1, the set of feasible choices is the intersection of the curve φ∆t−1
defined by 43, parameterized in aG with aG ≥ aG, and the set of (V Bt , V Gt ) with
Γt(V
B
t , V
G
t ) 6= ∅. Figure 1 depicts the intersection for the case of period 4 of 12 in
an example from our simulation. The solid lines represent the bounds V B4 (V
G
4 ) and
V
B
4 (V
G
4 ), while the dotted and the dashed line are curves φ∆3 with two different
values for ∆3.
Two things remain to be shown:
1. We have to show that the set of (V Bt−1, V
G
t−1), for which the intersection is
non-empty, itself takes the form of a set bounded by functions V Bt−1 and V
B
t−1.
2. We have to show that if curve 43 intersects the set of feasible values (V Bt , V
G
t ),
19If z = −∞, by our definition there is no limit on aG.
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Figure 1: Set of Jointly Feasible Entitlements in Period 4 of 12
−50 −45 −40 −35 −30 −25 −20 −15 −10 −5 0
−70
−60
−50
−40
−30
−20
−10
0
x-axis: Entitlements of type B, y-axis: Entitlements of type G
with projection of sets of agents’ choice sets
it cuts the bounds at most twice, so that the set of feasible choices is connected.
To show the first assertion, we look more closely at the family of curves
φ∆t−1 : a
G −→ [φB(aG), φG(aG)]∆t−1 ,
where
φB(a
G) =
1
βp′B(f
−1
B (∆t−1 + fG(aG)))
, (48)
φG(a
G) =
1
βp′G(aG)
. (49)
Since φG is one-to-one, the curves can also be understood as a function
V Bt = φ∆t−1(V
G
t ).
We now want to prove the following. The curves are “decreasing” in ∆t−1, i.e.
∆t−1 < ∆∗t−1 ⇒ φ∆t−1(V Gt ) > φ∆∗t−1(V Gt ). (50)
We do so by calculating the derivative
∂∆t−1(φ∆t−1)(V
G) = − 1
(βp′1(aB))2
· βp′′1(aB) ·
1
f ′θ1(∆t−1 + fθ2(a
G))
< 0,
which is negative because of 44 and Condition 2.4. The property of φ∆t−1 is reflected
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by its dotted line and the dashed representation in Figure 1.
By the induction hypothesis, the set of (V Bt , V
G
t ), for which Γt(V
B
t , V
G
t ) 6= ∅, is
compact and connected. Thus we deduce from 50 that there are ∆t−1 and ∆t−1 so
that the curves φ∆t−1 intersect the set for ∆t−1 ≤ ∆t−1 ≤ ∆t−1 and do not intersect
for ∆t−1 < ∆t−1 and ∆t−1 > ∆t−1 (of course ∆t−1 could be smaller than zero, the
lower limit for ∆t−1). From this ensues the existence of two functions, V Bt−1(V
G
t−1)
and V
B
t−1(V
G
t−1), limiting the set of feasible pairs (V
B
t−1, V
G
t−1).
To show the second assertion, we have to look more closely at the shape of the
curve φ∆t−1 as well as the limiting functions V
B
t−1(.) and V
B
t−1(.). First, we prove
that the derivative of φ∆t−1 is smaller than one. We do so by showing that
D(.) ◦ φ−1G (V Gt−1) := (φG(.)− φB(.)) ◦ φ−1G (V Gt−1)
is increasing in V Gt−1, i.e. the derivative of φ∆t−1 is below the one of the diagonal:
∂V Gt−1D(φ
−1
G (V
G
t−1)) = 1− ∂V Gt−1φB(φ−1G (V Gt−1)) > 0.
Since we know that
∂V Gt−1(φ
−1
G )(V
G
t−1) < 0
from (35), it is sufficient to show that
D′(aG) < 0.
Using aB := f−1B (∆t−1 + fG(a
G)) we calculate
D′(aG) = − p
′′
G(a
G)
β(p′G(aG))2
+
p′′B(a
B)
β(p′B(aB))2
· f
′
G(a
G)
f ′B(aB)
= − p
′′
G(a
G)
β(p′G(aG))2
+
p′′B(a
B)
β(p′B(aB))2
· pG(a
G)p′′G(a
G)
(p′G(aG))2
· (p
′
B(a
B))2
pB(aB)p′′B(aB)
=
(
pG(a
G)
pB(aB)
− 1
)
· p
′′
G(a
G)
β(p′G(aG))2
.
The last expression is negative by Conditions 2.4 and 2.6. Now, the second assertion
follows if we can show that the derivative of the boundary functions V B(.) and V
B
(.)
is greater than one, for then φ∆t−1 crosses them at most once. So by the induction
hypothesis, assume that V Bt (.) and V
B
t (.) have a derivative greater or equal than
one (note that this is certainly true for the case of t = T − 1).
According to what we have shown above, ∆t−1 and ∆t−1 limit the set of values
∆t−1 = V Gt−1 − V Bt−1 for which φ∆t−1 intersects the set of feasible (V Bt , V Gt ). From
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this we might be tempted to deduce immediately both V Bt−1 and V
B
t−1 must be linear
functions with derivative one, for apparently the limits only depend on the difference
∆t−1 = V Gt−1 − V Bt−1. Note, however, that the starting point aG (see equation 47)
for each curve φ∆t−1 is shifting upwards as V
G
t−1 is falling. Thus, since by induction
hypothesis V Bt and V
B
t are increasing more steeply than the φ∆t−1 , we may deduce
that
1. V Bt−1(.) is indeed linear with derivative one because the φ∆t−1s cross the func-
tion V Bt (.) at the lower bound V
G
t at a high value for a
G.
2. For lower values of V Gt−1, the smallest ∆t−1 for which φ∆t−1 intersects the set of
feasible values (V Bt , V
G
t ) is below the one that would have been obtained with
aG fixed. Since the latter would have corresponded to a linear upper bound
V
B
t (.) with derivative one, we conclude that V
B
t (.) has to rise more steeply
than this, i.e. that its derivative is greater than one.
Thus by induction, we have shown that φ∆t−1 and V
B
t−1(.) and V
B
t−1(.) cross only
once and the second assertion about the form of the correspondence Γt−1 ensues.
This concludes the proof of Proposition 3.3.
Proof of Proposition 3.7
Proof. To prove this proposition, we have to show that at the solution:
1. The entitlement constraint 15 of type G is slack;
2. The entitlement constraint 14 of type B is binding; and
3. The incentive constraint 13 of type G is binding.
Beginning with 1 we show that for all contracts, V G > V B. The assertion then
follows by V b,G > V b,B and agent B’s entitlement constraint 14.
So we consider a feasible UI contract. Given any set of effort choices (aB1 , a
B
2 , ..., a
B
T−1)
of agent B, the same set of choices would yield a higher value of total expected life-
time utility for agent G than for agent B, V G(~aB) > V B(~aB). This is the case
because firstly (total) utility when employed is higher than (total) utility when
unemployed (compare the remarks 3.4 and A.1), and secondly by condition 2.6,
first part, pB(a
B) > pG(a
B) for any aB > 0. Thus, in particular, at the optimum
V G > V B.
We now prove point 2 by contraction. Suppose that for the solution contracts
b, (zb1, ..., z
b
T ), and g, (z
g
1 , ..., z
g
T ), the constraint 14 did not bind. For sufficiently
high V we may assume that all zit > z for all t, in particular for t = 1. But then
create new contracts b’ and g’ by replacing zi1 by z
i
1 −  (i = b, g) for some  > 0
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with zi1 −  > z. These contracts are certainly feasible. They are also incentive
compatible, since the entitlements V i,j1 are reduced by the same amount. However,
the new contracts b’ and g’ are less costly for the principal, since the cost function
c(.) is strictly increasing. This is a contradiction.
Point 3 is proved by an argument simular to the one in point 2.
Proof of Corollary 3.8
Proof. The first assertion is point 2 in the proof of 3.7. To see the second assertion,
note that, given that V g,B is chosen optimally for each value of V g,G, the cost
function of contract g strictly increases in V g,G. Moreover, in a full information
optimum (i.e. the pure moral hazard case for both contracts), the optimal V b,G
(optimal with respect to V b,B = V ) can be characterized by a first order condition.
We thus obtain a first order reduction of costs for contract g by lowering V g,G = V b,G
(constraint 13 is binding) below the value of V b,G in a full information optimum,
whereas there is only a second order increase in costs for contract b.
Proof of Corollary 3.9
Proof. The fact that V g,G > V has been proved in Proposition 3.7; we can therefore
look at the second assertion. In our framework, we can recover the SW contracts
(i.e. the contracts from the pure moral hazard environment) at a given level of
entitlement V i,i by solving (i 6= j):
min
V i,j
Ci1(V
i,i, V i,j)
s.t. LOM,MH − IC
and applying forward induction afterwards. This is because by minimizing the costs
of contract i with respect to its value for agent j, we simply neglect the impact of
this value for the optimal contract.
Now, if our objective function is optimized without further restriction, we recover
the optimal contract from the pure moral hazard environment, because the value
V g,B of contract g for type B does not appear in the cost function of contract b.
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B Figures
Figure 2: UI Contracts with Adverse Selection
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‘o’ - contract b, ‘+’ - contract g
Entitlement bound V = −25
Figure 3: Reemployment Probability under UI Contracts
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y-axis: Reemployment probability, x-axis: Entitlement of type G
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Entitlement bound V = −25
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Figure 4: Shavell-Weiss Contracts
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Figure 5: Reemployment Probability under SW Contracts
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‘o’ - contract b, ‘+’ - contract g
Entitlement bound V = −25
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Figure 6: First-best Contracts
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Figure 7: Reemployment Probability under First-best Contracts
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Entitlement bound V = −25
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Figure 8: UI Contracts
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Entitlement bound V = −20
∼= Certainty equivalent of 68.67% of the wage per period
Figure 9: UI Contracts
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y-axis: Replacement rate, x-axis: Period
Entitlement bound V = −30
∼= Certainty equivalent of 55.21% of the wage per period
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Figure 10: UI Contracts with Type-dependent Entitlements
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y-axis: Replacement rate, x-axis: Period
Entitlement bound V B = −30, V G = −22∼= Certainty equivalent of 55.21% resp. 65.86% of the wage per period
Figure 11: UI Contracts with Type-dependent Entitlements
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y-axis: Replacement rate, x-axis: Period
Entitlement bound V B = −30, V G = −15∼= Certainty equivalent of 55.21% resp. 75.96% of the wage per period
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